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We use this data to focus on behavior, not race and ethnicity. In fact, what it allows us to do is move beyond crude profiling based on prejudice, and look at conduct and communication and actual behavior as a way of determining who we need to take a closer look at. (US Secretary for Homeland Security Michael Chertoff 2007, emphasis added) .
"The thing about raster graphics", Tariq was saying, "is that you can precisely manipulate an image by altering a single dot at a time […] What they'd like to do with real people if they could. I work on bitmaps to make better pictures.
That's raster graphics […] . 
Introduction: Making better pictures
Following the conviction and sentencing of the British 'fertilizer bombers' in May 2007, the US Secretary for Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, spoke publicly about the need to create better pictures of unknown terrorists in advance of their arrival on US shores. In his lecture at Johns Hopkins University, Chertoff placed his emphasis on how to decide what to focus on, who to look at, which suspicious behaviour is deserving of attention. The significance of his comments far exceeds the specific context of airline passenger data that he is addressing here, 2 embodying a novel and politically significant move in the very visuality of the war on terror. What do these data represent that they can be assumed to so nearly capture a picture of someone who has not yet been seen, who would not otherwise be recognised? If
Chertoff is correct and these pixelated people are not seen through racial or other categorises that are prejudicial, then what are the implications of living with a digital alter ego that, with the contemporary faith in techno-science, cannot be spurned?
The short answer is that the individuated items of data that have become the mainstay of the homefront of the war on terror appear as the 'dots' that, if only they can be successfully joined up, are assumed to reveal a picture of an unknown terrorist. Most often derived from the residue of daily life left in the patterns of travel, financial and consumer transactions (Amoore and de Goede 2005; 2008) , these abstracted items of data become the nodal points that, when joined in association with other items, are assumed to become an indisputable visualization of a person. It is not strictly, then, a picture or a snapshot of a person that is taken -an image from a specific and limited temporal standpoint -rather, it is a projected line of sight that seeks to capture the "unknown unknowns". 3 As in Richard Flanigan's startlingly observant novel, The
Unknown Terrorist, just as the contemporary consumer is targeted via simulated or projected images of her dreams and desires, so the citizen who becomes terrorist suspect finds her real self eclipsed by the projected picture of a dangerous and disturbed body, "morphing pixel by pixel", "becoming what she was not". Like the screened visualizations of migrants and travellers that allow the "border guard to become the last and not the first line of defence", or the London Underground pedestrian surveillance systems that "mean you don't have to watch the screen all the time", how we see, who we see, to what we give our attention, takes on renewed significance (Department of Homeland Security 2004; New Scientist 2003) .
As decisions based on human lines of sight are integrated with computer encoded visualizations, authorities begin to claim that the calculated projections of a person could never be racialized or otherwise violent or prejudicial, and are no longer a matter of profiling. In fact, Chertoff's claims for the data visualizations of an air passenger were made in the context of a stark choice he presented between denying
British citizens "of Pakistani origin" the right to visa waiver -categorizing British citizenship into degrees of risk, singling out those "potentially dangerous people" to whom "we should pay greater attention", -and the acceptance of a system of data mining that already identifies past travel to Pakistan and specific name algorithms, among many other associations, as "dangerous" (Chertoff 2007b ). The choice here, of course, is no choice at all, for the algorithmic calculation of who should be looked at more closely simply redraws the lines between those with entitlement (to visa, to cross a border, to be in a public place without disclosure of purpose) and those without. In short, the visa waiver effectively already is withdrawn from many British citizens by other means -via a picture "based on behaviour not background" (Chertoff 2007b ).
The deployment in the war on terror of ways of life, broadly defined -conduct, behaviour, social custom, movement across a railway platform or airport terminal -is, in many ways, nothing new or significant. Recall in the aftermath of 9/11 how the routines of daily life were called up as a source of resilience. "We were told to shop", says Susan Willis, "shop to show we are patriotic Americans. Shop to show our resilience over death and destruction" (2003: 122) . The London bombings on July 7
met with similar celebrations of the "vibrant and resilient city, getting back to normal, going back to work, getting back on the Tube". Yet, there is a need to be cautious with the treatment of culture in the practices of homeland security. Culture, Derek
Gregory explains "is never a mere mirror of the world", we can never simply hold up the looking glass of culture to shed new light on contemporary economy or society.
Rather, "culture involves the production, circulation and legitimation of meanings through representations, practices and performances that enter fully into the constitution of the world" (2004: 11). In the specific and situated circumstances I am interested in here, culture embodies and advances an economy -a means of apportioning, segregating, singling out for our collective attentions. How do ways of life come to be known and recognised as such? How is a 'normal' way of life settled out, and how does it identify deviations from norm? What does the call to attentiveness to 'conduct' or 'behaviour' ask us to pay attention to? How do we know
what it is that we should pay attention to? As in contemporary profiling of consumers in the marketplace -where the as-yet-unencountered unknown consumer is the holy grail sought via fragments of data on their conduct and behaviour -so in today's homeland security practice, the unknown terrorist is rendered knowable through the fractured bits and bytes of a way of life.
In this article, I consider this economy of attention or attentiveness to the world, how it is that we come to focus on some elements of our way of life, establish them as normal and designate deviations from the norm. How does this attentiveness break up the visual field, 'pixelating' sensory data so that it can be reintegrated to build a picture of a person? Throughout, I am inspired by the work of art historian Jonathan
Crary, whose careful and detailed genealogies of attention and its role in human subjectivity have urged us to consider that modern sensory stimuli are not primarily about making a subject see, but about "strategies of isolation and separation" (1999:
3 is "not primarily concerned with looking at images but rather with the construction of conditions that individuate, immobilize, and separate subjects, even within a world in which mobility and circulation are ubiquitous " (1999: 74) . In this sense, practices of attention are one specific means of instituting the dividing practices at the heart of contemporary techniques of government. and a 'window', at once opaque and transparent". The flat surface of the screen, the 'page' that represents the calculation in this instance, is given depth by the layers and leaves of data, the multiple other screens and screenings that may appear transparent to the viewer but remain opaque to the person who is displayed there. The surface of the screen has, then "a deep virtual reach to archives and databases, indexed and accessible with barely the stroke of a finger" (Friedberg 2006: 19) .
The screened forms of attention that are dominating contemporary homeland security practice function through a process of 'screening out'. That is to say, they take large quantities of data, multiple sources of stimuli, and they sort and classify that which will appear on the surface. Inside the 34 'surface' items of airline passenger data in passenger name records, for example, are multiple layers of pieces of a persons life, integrated together via pre-screening programmes such as USVISIT, to produce a picture of a person's posed risk to security. It is, of course, only pixelated fragments that enter the visualization, vast quantities of data simultaneously fall out of the calculation, become 'background noise' and are screened out. In many ways this focusing of attention via the annulment of other sensory data is integral to the histories of practices of perception:
Whether it is how we behave in front of the luminous screen of a computer or how we experience a performance in an opera house, how we accomplish certain productive or creative tasks or how we more passively perform routine activities like driving a car or watching television, we are in a dimension of contemporary experience that requires that we effectively cancel out or exclude from consciousness much of our immediate environment (Crary 1999: 1).
For Crary, the way that we have come to focus our attention on particular items, tasks or people cannot be understood without also acknowledging the processes that cancel out or exclude other stimuli. When we attend to one set of sensory data, in order to make it count we necessarily discount other sources. Crary identifies a critical turning point in the mid nineteenth century, when scientific knowledge about how an embodied observer sees and perceives the world "disclosed possible ways that vision was open to procedures of normalization" (1999: 12; see also Crary 1992) . It is precisely this normalization within practices of attention that is at work in the visuality of homeland security. When the call is to look for that which is abnormal, out of the ordinary, or when the data on an individual is sorted according to patterns of normality and deviation, most of the detail behind the data is cancelled out.
Conduct and behaviour that could, if attended to or seen differently, be an integral part of the 'norm', becomes part of the conduct and behaviour designated deviant from norm and rendered suspicious. Thus, what might be expected to be 'normal' patterns of travel or financial transactions for a British citizen with family in Pakistan -travel to visit relatives, wire transfers of monetary gifts, telephone calls -will, within the screened attentiveness to passenger data, be designated suspicious. Like Richard Flanagan's protagonist, 'the Doll' in his novel The Unknown Terrorist, whose careful earnings from lapdancing are hidden in her apartment -savings to buy a house, to find the security and prosperity that is promised to the prudent citizenwhat would be the norm becomes deviant, the cash becomes evidence of "a cell financing its activities through drug running and the sex industry" (2006: 231).
In close association: attending to difference
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the homeland face of the war on terror identified an enemy whose probable future actions were already visible in the traces of life left in existing data. Giving evidence at a US Congressional hearing only five months practices. The idea is that locating regularities in large and disparate patterns of data can enable associations to be established between apparently 'suspicious' people, places, financial transactions, cargo shipments and so on (Ericson 2007) . Rules of association are produced by algorithms -models or "decision trees" for a calculation (Quinlan 1986 ). In effect, algorithms precisely function as a means of directing and disciplining attention, focusing on specific points and cancelling out all other data, appearing to make it possible to translate probable associations between people or objects into actionable security decisions. In 2003, for example, a US joint inquiry concluded that "on September 11, enough relevant data was resident in existing databases", so that "had the dots been connected", the events could have been "exposed and stopped " (2003: 14) . It is precisely this 'connecting of dots' that is the work of the algorithm. By connecting the dots of probabilistic associations, the algorithm becomes a means of foreseeing or anticipating a course of events yet to take place:
If we learned anything from September 11 2001, it is that we need to be better at connecting the dots of terrorist-related information. After September 11, we used credit card and telephone records to identify those linked with the hijackers. But wouldn't it be better to identify such connections before a hijacker boards a plane?
( It is important at this point to emphasise the ambiguity of practices of attention and attentiveness. It is not the case that these are wholly disciplinary practices that act on and through us and our lives. As Crary has argued, though industrialization and the market economy saw "perception function in a way that insures a subject is productive, manageable, and predictable, able to be socially integrated and adaptive", simultaneously the management of attention reached limits characterised by more "creative states of deep absorption and daydreaming" (1999: 4-5) . So, whilst the conduct of commerce and trade required particular attentive habits, it stimulated also the more creative and subjective ways of seeing that flourished in the arts (1999: 52).
Arguably, in terms of attentiveness and the visualization of people, something interesting and politically challenging is also happening at the intersection of these 'productive' and 'creative' domains of attention. There can be little doubt that projected futures are experienced as both dangers and desires. As media theorist
Jordan Crandall has argued:
Being-seen is an ontological necessity; we strive to be accounted for within the dominant representational matrices of our time. We are not only talking about a gaze that is intrusive and controlling. We are talking about a gaze that provides the condition for action -the gaze for which one acts (2005: 20).
Consider, for example, the luxury fashion brand Prada and, specifically, the architectures of their New York flagship store. The glass walled building, stretching one block and opening up inside with spaces to walk around, see and be seen, the store replaces displays of visible products with technologies that connect the consumer's sense of identity to future Prada projections of the person. The radio frequency identification (RFID) tags inside the clothing send radio signals to a screen in the fitting rooms, triggering images of the clothing as seen on the catwalk. The glass walls of the dressing room change in phases from transparent to opaque, and large video screens "replace mirrors to show your back and side views live" (Kang and Cuff 2005: 121) . The miniaturized sensor technologies embedded in the clothing and in store cards and credit cards provide focal points to be connected together in the visualization of the consumer. As these same RFID technologies are now inserted into passports and immigration documents, providing a route of identification into a visualized person, we see both commercial and security drives to become attentive to the element of surprise, the unpredictable or impulsive act.
In this sense, algorithmic techniques for making visible mobile people, and indeed products, goods and money, embody what Samuel Weber calls a "target of opportunity", a competitive "seizing" of "targets that were not foreseen or planned" (2005: 4) . The targets of opportunity in the war on terror, then, involve the depiction of unknown and mobile enemies:
However different the war on terror was going to be from traditional wars, with their relatively well-defined enemies, it would still involve one of the basic mechanisms of traditional hunting and combat, in however modified and modernized a form: namely "targeting". The enemy would have to be identified and localized, named and depicted, in order to be made into an accessible target… None of this was, per se, entirely new. What was, however, was the mobility, indeterminate structure, and unpredictability of the spatiotemporal medium in which such targets had to be sited… In theatres of conflict that had become highly mobile and changeable, "targets" and "opportunity"
were linked as never before. In fact, of course, the algorithmic 'decision trees' do not take decisions at all, they merely defer decision into a calculation that is pre-programmed. 6 While they appear to visualize a picture of a person that is culturally nuanced -every minute and prosaic "behaviour", every aspect of a way of life potentially becoming a part of the classification -they actually efface difference in their drive for identification. The logic of association rules appears to be peculiarly dependent on culture, yet it is a representation of culture that attends too (and makes us attentive to) some aspects of sameness and difference, whilst always failing to confront the agonistic difference at the heart of political life (Connolly 1991: 170-171) . The claims that visualizations used in place of 'face-to-face' pictures avoid racial profiling and other prejudicial judgements cannot be upheld. It is always through the visualization of the identity of the 'other' that the sanctity of 'we the nation', 'we the people' is sustained. As
Connolly puts it, the "self reassurance of identity" is made "through the construction and otherness" and this otherness is readily adopted as the "definition of difference"
(1991: 9). The algorithmic attentiveness, then, becomes the "multicultural" 7 society's technology of choice precisely because it gives the appearance of living alongside difference, of deciding without prejudice -"we are interested in behaviour not background"; "this is not racial profiling"; "we prefer screening to visa restrictions"; "no more border guards taking decisions based on appearance" -when in fact it categorizes, isolates and annexes in ways that conceal the violence inside the glossy wrapper of techno-science.
There is an intensely important political problem here, then. We are faced with a technique of governing that makes humane, responsible or ethical ways of paying attention to the world extraordinarily difficult. Consider, for example, Waverly
Cousin, former police officer and one of the 43 000 "screeners" employed by the US Transportation Security Administration to deploy the "screening passengers by observation technique" (SPOT) at airports, ports and border crossings. "The observation of human behaviour is probably the hardest thing to defeat", explains 
Attention in a state of distraction: what the artist saw
I have argued that theories of attention and attentiveness derived from histories of art are capable of revealing something significant about the contemporary economy of homeland security culture: that it is not primarily a way of seeing or surveilling the world, but rather a means of dividing, isolating, annexing in order to visualize what is "unknown". Yet, it is not only in concepts from the arts, but also in the practices of artistic intervention that we find a potentially valuable ethics and responsibility in how we pay attention to ourselves and other people. An "absorbed attentiveness", writes Crary, is not only a "necessary part of the individual's functioning within a modern world of economic facts and quantities", but is always also essential for the "creative exceeding of the limits of individuality" (1999: 53). Because relations of power inextricably contain the possibility of resistance, there could never be a fully efficient attentive subject whose attention to the world is entirely amenable to management. Indeed, as Crary has it, "the more one investigated, the more attention was shown to contain within itself the condition for its own undoing" (1999: 45-6).
Art theory and practice is all too readily overlooked as "merely cultural" by the social sciences, accused of "substituting a trivial form of politics" that focuses on "transient events, practices and objects" in place of a "serious" political economy of transformation (Butler 1998 (2005: 260) . This is, argues
Crary, "experimental activity" that "involves the creation of unanticipated spaces and environments in which our visual and intellectual habits are challenged and disrupted" (2003: 7) . In contrast to an attentiveness that tries to anticipate on the basis of the fragments that are seen, then, some installation artwork in public space offers us new ways of attending to the very images we had already screened out as normal.
American artist Rozalinda Borcila's Geography Lessons, for example, seeks to "intervene in apparently controlled spaces" that are "policed through What is particularly interesting about artistic practices that engage with some of the emergent technologies of attention, is that they do not seek out a resolution to the political difficulties posed. Instead, they create a plural space for the articulation of difference, "integrating technological tools into plural zones of creative activity" and providing ways of imaging the problem outside of narratives of security or consumption (Crary 2003: 9) . By way of example, consider New York artist Meghan
Trainor, whose work integrates RFID tags -ubiquitous in the visualization of consumers and security 'threats' -into public installations and performances (see figure 2 ). The installation "lets viewers encounter RFID tags in an application outside of its common commercial or surveillance context", explains Trainor, "allowing for different reactions to its current and expanding ubiquity in our lives" (Trainor 2004).
Rather than seek to resolve the paradoxes and contradictions of these technological forms of attentiveness, then, the artworks function "as catalyst" to the exposure of paradox and contradiction (De Oliveira 2003) . They remind us that within apparently disciplined and securitized modes of attention there are also interstitial spaces of "inattention", "enchantment" or "reverie" that may work against prejudicial and individualised practices (Bennett 2001) . The background images and data that are discarded by security practices of visualization are potentially recovered by the changed perspectives of artistic interventions.
Finally, visionary work in artistic practice has, as its raison d'etre, a form of critique that runs 'against the grain' of dominant knowledge about how we pay attention to the world. In Edward Said's last book before his death, he documents the 'late' work of visionary artists and musicians as not that which has "harmony and resolution", but that which embodies "intransigence, difficulty, and unresolved contradiction" (2006: 14) . In contrast to a line of sight that sees clearly and rationally, then, art against the grain is that which transgresses prevailing modes of thought in order to see the world differently. Thomas Keenan conjures a comparable alternative 'line' of sight against the grain when he speaks of politics "on the bias", where there is "a withdrawal of the rules or the knowledge on which we might rely to take our decisions for us" (1997:
166).
In order for responsibility to be reintroduced to the decision, then, it is necessary for us to consider this diagonal line of sight that cuts across prevailing ways of attending to the world. A final example of such a cut across the grain can be seen in British artist Michael Landy's three year project, Break Down. Situating his work in a disused department store on London's Oxford Street, Landy made an inventory of his lifedismantling, weighing and cataloguing every item that he owned. Simulating the breaking up, classifying and profiling of individuals through their data, Landy stripped his pixelated profile down to nothing, publicly displaying the 7000 disassembled objects on a moving production line. Because codified data can be used to visualize a person, no matter how absurd or tenuous, the artists who experiment with alternative ways to visualize a person do so against the grain, offering new modes of attention that attend also to the calculation that is made.
Conclusion: citizenship and unknown futures
In one reading of the implications of vigilant and anticipatory lines of sight for citizenship, a specific embodiment of the citizen is produced: an attentive, watchful and watched citizen whose actions and transactions in daily life are called up to secure the homeland security state. It is perhaps for this reason that so much attention has been paid in recent times, across the social sciences, to the surveillant practices of an apparently 'post 9/11 world'. And yet, as Foucault warned in his lectures on the emerging security apparatus, the panopticon is "completely archaic", and "the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign " (2007: 66) . In contrast to the "exhaustive surveillance of individuals", a "discipline" that "concentrates, focuses and encloses", Foucault observes an "apparatus of security" that "opens up" to "let things happen" ( 
